Hospitals' Star-Crossed Financial Engineering

And speaking of the costs of financial maneuvering by hospitals, the Wall Street Journal just reported on "Hospitals' Wall Street Wounds,"

Hospitals nationwide are tangling with Wall Street to get out of disastrous wagers that have complicated their financial problems.


Some hospitals are paying millions of dollars in penalties to get out of derivatives contracts, after betting incorrectly that interest rates would rise. Other hospitals are paying higher interest rates. At many, these ill-fated financial bets have contributed to layoffs and scuttled projects.


More than 500 nonprofit hospitals—at least one in six—bought interest-rate "swaps" in a bid to lower their borrowing costs, estimates Municipal Market Advisors, a Concord, Mass., consulting firm. The swaps allowed hospitals to act much like homeowners switching from a floating-rate mortgage to fixed-rate one, betting on rising interest rates.

For a fee, the hospitals received a fixed rate to sell bonds, lower than the municipal-bond market at the time. These bets backfired when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to nearly zero from more than 5% in 2007.

Hospitals also issued auction-rate securities—which reset bond prices weekly or monthly through auctions—that represented about a third of the $330 billion market for these derivatives. Hospitals paid Wall Street firms more than $120 million in fees for the securities between 2005 and 2007, said data firm Thomson Reuters. That market dried in the 2008 financial panic, leaving hospitals with higher interest rates.

The article included a few pointed examples, e.g.,

In April 2007, Smith Barney brokers pitched Tri-City Medical Center in Oceanside, Calif., on ways to save money on interest rates. In a presentation, the brokers argued that the hospital could save tens of millions of dollars by refinancing its debt with derivatives from parent Citigroup, according to a lawsuit filed in April 2010 against Citigroup and Smith Barney, now co-owned by Morgan Stanley.

'Historically low' interest rates created an 'optimal environment,' according to Citigroup documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. 'Citigroup can mitigate the primary risks,' according to a slide presentation.

Persuaded that it could cut its interest rate—5.7% at the time—on $67 million in outstanding bonds, the hospital issued auction-rate securities and added interest-rate swaps, according to the lawsuit and Daniel Callahan, an attorney for the hospital.

Soon, the auction-rate market collapsed. Investors stopped bidding on these securities and the banks that sold them stopped acting as a buyer of last resort as they had in the past. This forced many hospitals and other issuers to pay a maximum penalty rate—sometimes up to 20%—that kicks in if there aren't buyers.

As a result, rates shot up to 17%, costing Tri-City some $16 million more than it would have paid under its old rates, according to the lawsuit, filed in California Superior Court in Orange County.

The hospital board replaced many top officials and paid Citigroup more than $6 million to get out of the auction-rate securities and the interest-rate swaps, Mr. Callahan said.

The loss 'continues to impact Tri-City's ability to meet the needs of the entire community,' Mr. Callahan said, delaying the expansion of services and capital improvements.

Auction-rate securities 'were an engineered, artificial market supported by the activities of the investment bankers designed to postpone a collapse,' the hospital alleges in the lawsuit.

At least one financial expert agreed:

'Financial engineering by Wall Street has been a huge part of hospital's financial problems and has even translated into a lack of hospital beds,' said Brian McGough, a managing director of health-care investments at Bank of Montreal Capital Markets in Chicago.

This is another example of how health care organizations, including respected not-for-profit institutions, jumped headlong into the transactions first economy of the last 20 plus years.  The were lured by the prospect of making easy money from financial transactions.  However, it looked like those who really made money were the middle men who sold everyone on the magic of derivatives.

You would have thought that the highly compensated financial wizards that hospitals and other health care not-for-profits chose for their leaders in the last 20 plus years would have been able to see through such nonsense.  Why were they paid so much, if not for expertise in this area?  But I would suspect that they too became distracted by all the money floating their way to think about how it might end. 

We have often decried the problems of ill-informed health care leaders who do not have direct experience in actually providing health care, or much sympathy for the values of health care professionals.  Breaking the medical "guild," and putting professional managers in charge of health care was once touted as a way to control costs.  It is ironic that after  health care organizations became sold on the uncanny abilities of managers with business, usually finance or marketing training, these geniuses turned out to be as gullible about the wonders of Wall Street as everyone else. 

The Failure of "Success Healthcare" - When Financial Maneuvering Takes Precedence Over the Health Care Mission

In the last few years, it seems that the whole world got tangled up in a web of complex financial dealings that mostly benefited those moving the money and paper, but often harmed everyone else.  So it should be no surprise that health care was similarly affected. 

A story from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch provided an illustrative case.  The news article began discussing the current difficulties of two local St Louis hospitals, then provided an explanation in what amounted to a series of flashbacks. Let me re sequence it a bit, starting with the background of two local hospitals that got caught up in web.

Background

For several decades, Forest Park Hospital — founded in 1889 as Deaconess Central Hospital — was one of the city’s leading community hospitals, serving a broad spectrum of patients including many African-American residents from north St. Louis.

But in recent years, the hospital’s revenues and its number of patient visits had waned because, in part, of the emergence of major hospitals in west St. Louis County and its decision in 2006 to discontinue obstetric services.

As the hospital struggled, it continued to be passed along from one owner to the next. In 2004, it was acquired by Argilla Healthcare Inc. Argilla merged with Doctors Community Healthcare Corp. of Scottsdale, Ariz., which became Envision Hospital Corp.

Former board member Buford said Forest Park’s downfall began several years ago when Envision executives made the decision to use the hospital’s profits to help prop up a faltering hospital that Envision owned in Washington.

In 2005, Envision sold the buildings and land of Forest Park Hospital and St. Alexius Hospital to Medline Industries, the Illinois manufacturer of surgical supplies.

How the Hospitals were Sold to Success Healthcare LLC

To address its financial problems, Envision decided to sell its accounts receivable to a firm in Florida. Here is the rationale:

Less successful hospitals operate on razor-thin profit margins, waiting for slow-paying state and federal agencies to provide Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements. Such hospitals have difficulty obtaining financing and lack dependable cash flow.

To provide support to a distressed hospital, the Florida partners would purchase its accounts receivables at a discount. For instance, if the government, a health insurer or patient owed a hospital for services, the partners would purchase that invoice for less money. The hospital, in turn, would have cash in hand.

Note that "hospitals tend to avoid such cash-flow companies, because some of them use heavy-handed collection tactics." However,

For struggling Forest Park and St. Alexius, selling their accounts receivables was an alluring option.

So,

Forest Park also was dogged by creditors and having difficulty making its payroll and paying utility bills.

That’s when Envision began doing business with one of the Florida partners’ firms, Sun Capital Healthcare Inc., which purchased $61 million in receivables from Forest Park and St. Alexius.

When Envision defaulted on its sales agreement in September 2008, the Florida partners formed Success [Healthcare LLC] to purchase the two hospitals for $39.5 million.

The Promise of a Turn Around

To the public and the struggling hospitals, the purchase by Success Healthcare LLC seemed a promise of deliverance:

Eighteen months ago, the new buyers of Forest Park Hospital vowed to revive the beleaguered institution.


They voiced optimism that the once-thriving, 450-bed medical center could be saved by fresh capital and determined leadership. They seemed equally enthusiastic about their other acquisition — St. Alexius Hospital in south St. Louis. Even the name of their company — Success Healthcare LLC — evoked the sense that better days were ahead.

Also,

When Success Healthcare bought Forest Park Hospital in December 2008, company officials spoke of transitions, not cutbacks.

In a statement, the company called Forest Park and St. Alexius hospitals important community assets, saying that it planned to enact a 'turnaround plan and financial strategy' in the next six months “that will support the immediate and long-term objectives for the hospitals.'

The Actual Results

Better days were not ahead.  Instead, as summarized by the Post-Dispatch article,

But the three partners from South Florida were ill-prepared to make good on their words. In reality, they were already deep in a financial scandal that involved the potential loss of more than $500 million in investor funds, the suicide of an investment manager in Bermuda, and allegations of fraud and self-dealing.

The mess resulted from the involvement of what became Success Healthcare LLC and an off-shore financier. First, here is some information on the history of the ironically named Success Healthcare LLC:

In recent years, [Peter] Baronoff, [Howard] Koslow and [Lawrence] Leder had built a small empire of health-related companies, whose holdings include at least 18 hospitals, and two finance firms. The firms share an office building at 999 Yamato Road in Boca Raton, Fla.

Baronoff, a former deputy mayor of Boca Raton, had worked as a wine and spirits importer. Koslow had experience in financial services and real estate. Leder, an accountant, was a former supervisory auditor for the U.S. General Accounting Office.

The partners marketed themselves as 'rescuing health care clients in financial emergencies,' including providers that file for bankruptcy protection or are considering such a filing.

Then enter the off-shore financier:

Court records indicate that the Florida partners approached [William] Gunlicks in 1999 to invest in the health care receivables business. Two of the partners — Koslow and Baronoff — formed a Bermuda-based venture with Gunlicks in December 2009 called Stewards & Partners Ltd. to attract offshore investors.

But between 1999 and December, 2009, things had had gone bad,

The first sign of serious problems appeared in April 2009, when the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a case against money manager William Gunlicks, a former Chicago banker whose investment funds provided hundreds of millions of dollars to the Florida partners to help finance their ventures. The SEC accused Gunlicks of placing at risk about $550 million in investor funds, including $5 million invested by the archdiocese of New Orleans.

Soon after, Gunlicks’ fund manager in Bermuda killed himself with an overdose of pills, upset that he had lured investors to the troubled fund, according to media reports. Gunlicks, who declined to comment, settled the SEC case — agreeing not to operate another investment fund.

In July 2009, a receiver appointed by a federal judge — whose mission is to recover Gunlicks’ investor’s money — sued the Florida partners’ finance companies for allegedly defaulting on loan payments to Gunlicks. The receiver accused the partners of fraudulently transferring hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase or prop up distressed hospitals that they owned. Investors also have sued the Florida partners.

The troubles afflicting Success Healthcare LLC quickly affected the hospitals they had promised to save:

There are conflicting accounts about the financial strength of the Florida partners, but this is clear: They do not appear to have the wherewithal to operate Forest Park as a full-service hospital, and their financial troubles could also negatively affect St. Alexius, which reported in 2008 a bare-bones profit margin of 1.38 percent.

Daniel Newman, the court-appointed receiver, has asserted that the Florida partners’ finance firms 'had long been insolvent ... and had been losing money.' He has accused them of overstating their revenues and assets to conceal at least $50 million in losses in recent years.

The results on local health care were not good:

By April of this year, Forest Park Hospital had laid off about three-quarters of its staff and reduced its operations to a small emergency department, 20-bed psychiatric ward, laboratory and pharmacy.

'It’s a very dire situation,' said Dr. James Buford, president of the Urban League and a former member of the Forest Park Hospital’s board. 'It wouldn’t surprise me if the hospital went under. There hasn’t been a necessary infusion of capital to make it work.'

Today, Forest Park Hospital is an almost empty landmark that overlooks the renovated Highway 40 (Interstate 64). The hospital is trying to use only one of its six floors and staffs a few dozen patient beds. Meanwhile, St. Alexius Hospital continues to offer a range of patient services, though it staffs only about one-third of its 456 licensed beds.

Summary

First, I must admit that it is possible that the two St Louis hospitals could not have been maintained in their original configurations by even the most knowledgeable, dedicated, and visionary leadership. It may be that there location was untenable, given the growth of powerful competitors.

However, it is hard to believe that the complex financial maneuvers in which they were caught up provided any benefits to patients, health care, or health professionals. Instead, it is likely that these maneuvers provided considerable personal gains to the people behind them (although these were not investigated in the St Louis Post Dispatch story).

The big lesson: be very skeptical of glorious promises, especially those that come from new health care leaders who turn out to have no knowledge or background in health care. (Note that the leaders of Success Healthcare had no apparent background in actually providing health care, and no apparent commitment to the values health care professionals ought to support.) When you meet the new boss, assume at best he or she will be "same as the old boss," (to the lyrics of "Won't Get Fooled Again.")  We seem to be caught up in a business culture in which every new leader and fashionable management strategy is hyped and spun, and somehow people believe it all, forgetting how badly the previously hyped leaders and strategies crashed.

How many times have we health professionals been told the new CEO, the new corporation taking over, the new business strategy will make everything better? How often has that been true?

Health care desperately needs leadership that understand the context, and believes in the values.  The quick buck artists have been making themselves rich, while health care on the ground becomes poor.  How much money goes into the pocket of the clever leaders for their fancy financial maneuvers, rather than to provide patient care?  The answer might explain why US health care is the most expensive in the world, while primary care, and in this case, basic hospital acute care becomes less available.

The Stewards of an Elite University, or a "Politburo" of "Shadow Bankers?"

We have postulated that one of the key reasons US health care has become so dysfunctional is that the leaders of some of the most august health care institutions have strayed from, if not totally abandoned their organizations' fundamental missions.  There are many possible reasons for this phenomenon, but one is that the ultimate stewards of not-for-profit health care organizations, their boards of directors or trustees, have become uninterested in the mission, or impotent to uphold it.  So, we have tried to figure out what has happened to these boards that has lead to this sorry state.

Dartmouth College: the Packing of the Board of Trustees

One example we have come frequently discussed (beginning here) is that of Dartmouth College, despite its name, really a university, and one of the elite American universities which includes a well-regarded medical school.   For a long time, Dartmouth had one of the more accountable and representative systems of governance found in US universities.  Recently, however, this accountability and transparency was challenged by some of the College's own leaders. 

Most boards of trustees are self-elected.  When an old member leaves, the new members elect his or her successor.  Dartmouth alumni, however can elect eight members of the board of trustees. Until recently, eight others were "charter trustees," who were individually chosen by the other charter trustees, and two were ex-officio. Although the College's Association of Alumni traditionally nominated alumni to run for trustee positions, candidates could be nominated by petition, and starting in 2004, four such petition candidates were elected.

As described by FIRE, the Foundation for Integrity and Responsibility in Medicine, this more open process fostered change in how the university was lead, and seemed to foster renewed attention to the institution's mission:

These trustees spoke out when they perceived their alma mater as not living up to its mission, and Dartmouth students benefited. In May 2005, the college repealed its speech code, and it immediately moved from FIRE's 'red-light' rating and became a 'green-light' institution.

As might be expected, the reigning leadership was not pleased.

Some campus officials viewed the propensity of petition candidates to voice their opinions on illiberal policies as detrimental to the school's image. The Wall Street Journal profiled T.J. Rodgers, a petition-nominated trustee, who explained the criticisms leveled at the 'divisive dissidents.'

'If 'divisive' means there are issues and we debate the issues and move forward according to a consensus, then divisive equals democracy, and democracy is good. The alternative, which I fear is what the administration and [Board of Trustees Chairman] Ed Haldeman are after right now, is a politburo-one-party rule.'

In 2007, in apparent response to the "divisiveness" of the petition trustees, the Charter Trustees proposed increasing their own numbers. Chairman Ed Haldeman's rationale for this, as we discussed here, was to ensure that the board "has the broad range of backgrounds, skills, expertise, and fundraising capabilities needed," and that the board members would possess "even more diverse backgrounds."

Charter Trustees or "Shadow Bankers"?

Yet when we examined the backgrounds of the current charter trustees, we found that they exhibited little diversity. Remarkably, three-quarters (6/8) were in leaders of the finance sector. The board chairman, Ed Haldeman, was then the leader of Putnam Funds.  Now, he is the CEO of "Freddie Mac."  In 2007, the significance of this kind of lack of diversity were not clear.  However, it did seem strange that those accused of seeking to form a "politburo" came from the Wall Street, the street that the left once loved to hate.

However, by late 2008, the world economy descended into an unprecedented financial collapse. Many concluded that the global economic collapse was caused by arrogance, greed, and corruption within the financial sector. This suggested that leadership of academia, and academic medicine in particular, by leaders of the finance sector might not, in retrospect, have been a such a good idea. When we reexamined the composition of the now enlarged cohort of Charter Trustees, however, we found nine of 13 "charter" trustees were leaders in finance, now including three in asset management, two in private equity, one in the field formerly known as investment banking, one in venture capital, one in mutual funds, and one in strategic consulting and investment. Of the remaining four, one was the CEO of a large diversified corporation that has a major finance subsidiary. The remaining three were two physicians and a pharmaceutical corporate CEO.

Given the ongoing financial chaos at the time, we again suggested that a board dominated by business leaders in the finance sector might not be a good idea. Last week, a report came out suggesting why we were right.

Charter Trustees as Dartmouth's Own "Shadow Bankers"

"Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic Risks in the Shadow Banking System," published by the Center for Social Philanthropy, Tellus Institute, focused on how prominent educational institutions, including Dartmouth College, came to invest much of their endowments in risky, illiquid "alternative" investments, the sort provided by the "shadow banking system." The report noted that this change lead to greater financial risks, leading to recent losses and consequent sharp cutbacks in spending, programs, and employment at the affected institutions. In particular, however, it focused on leadership and governance problems at the institutions that lead to this state of affairs.

Although the emergence of the high-risk Endowment Model of Investing has taken place against the backdrop of powerful forces of financial globalization and the influence of Modern Portfolio Theory, its consolidation and influence today at colleges and universities depend vitally on college leaders: senior administrators, trustees, and investment managers, especially the increasingly prominent role of chief investment officer, or CIO. The financial crisis has in many ways been a crisis of leadership. The precipitous declines endowments have suffered during the credit crisis need to be understood as the logical outcome of the Endowment Model’s high risk strategies, but behind the model stand those who are ultimately responsible for its execution: whether as professional money managers, investment officers, affiliated investment management companies, outside managers, or investment consultants, or as the fiduciaries sitting on governing boards and investment committees.

At Dartmouth, in particular, the report focused on conflicts of interest among the board of trustees:

When it comes to weakened endowment oversight, the most glaring problem arises from trustees from the finance industry whose firms provide investment management services. One of the most disconcerting cases in this respect is that of Dartmouth College, where the sudden departure of CIO David Russ in 2009 created a leadership vacuum over endowment management. The college’s investment committee chair and trustee Stephen Mandel has played the CIO role on a voluntary, part-time basis since last summer and will continue to do so until he becomes chair of the board of trustees later this year. At the same time, Mandel’s firm, Lone Pine Capital LLC, a well known hedge-fund complex he founded in 1997, has also managed an investment mandate from the college’s endowment valued originally at $10 million. Although the college has a conflict-of interest policy and is required to disclose such 'pecuniary benefit transactions' with the state of New Hampshire, it would seem difficult for fellow trustees to provide proper oversight of investments managed by a fellow trustee serving as the de-facto CIO. Additionally, if Mandel recuses himself from committee or board deliberations related to his firm, then the investment committee must function without its chair.

However, the problem is magnified because Mandel is only one of more than half a dozen Dartmouth trustees whose firms manage multimillion-dollar investments for the endowment, according to the college’s filings with Charitable Trusts Unit of the New Hampshire Department of Justice. Leon Black’s firm Apollo Management has reportedly managed at least $40 million in Dartmouth investments. Russell Carson’s private equity firm[Welsh, Carson, Anderson and Stowe] has reportedly received at least $45 million in commitments of capital from Dartmouth. William Helman, IV’s venture capital firm Greylock Partners, has reportedly received $10 million investment mandates from the college, while R. Bradford Evans’ firm Morgan Stanley has done multiple transactions
with the college, varying from investments in international real estate and hedge funds to bond issuances, all at undisclosed levels. P. Andrew McLane [T A Associates] and Jonathan Newcomb [Leeds Weld and Co] have also had reported interests in college investments at undisclosed levels. For an endowment of its size— Dartmouth’s endowment fell to less than $3 billion in fiscal year 2009—the deep dependence on trustees’ own businesses for endowment management seems disproportionate.

Thus, one half of the membership of Dartmouth's Charter Trustees were also being paid by Dartmouth to manage its endowment investments.  However, as the Tellus Institute report noted,

Leading experts on nonprofit board governance, such as Richard Chait at Harvard University, stress that colleges should simply not do business with the companies of their board members, in order to avoid inevitable distractions and the sense of divided loyalties that arise, to say nothing of appearances of self-dealing and personal enrichment

Another "Missing Link": Board Members Doing Business with the Organizations They are Supposed to Steward

We have frequently discussed the web of conflicts of interest that now permeates health care.  Most of the conflicts we have discussed up to now involve physicians or academicians who have financial ties to pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies.  Health care organizational leaders also do business  with the organizations they lead have not until recently been a topic of discussion, mainly because such conflicts of interest have rarely been disclosed.

It looks like this is going to change.  The US Internal Revenue Service sought disclosure of such conflicts of interest affecting hired executives and boards of trustees of not-for-profit organizations beginning in 2009.  These disclosures, reported on IRS form 990, are just beginning to be made public.  We just posted about members of the board of directors of a large academic health care system who also lead or owned companies that did substantial business with the system.  Now we see that a substantial portion of the board of trustees of Dartmouth lead financial firms that managed a major portion of the College's endowment, perhaps to the overall detriment of the endowment's performance.  No wonder the Charter Trustees got nervous about petition trustees poking about their business.

 As summarized by BoardSource, there are three traditional duties of members of boards of trustees of not-for-profit organizations:

Duty of Care

The duty of care describes the level of competence that is expected of a board member, and is commonly expressed as the duty of "care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances." This means that a board member owes the duty to exercise reasonable care when he or she makes a decision as a steward of the organization.

Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty is a standard of faithfulness; a board member must give undivided allegiance when making decisions affecting the organization. This means that a board member can never use information obtained as a member for personal gain, but must act in the best interests of the organization.

Duty of Obedience

The duty of obedience requires board members to be faithful to the organization's mission. They are not permitted to act in a way that is inconsistent with the central goals of the organization. A basis for this rule lies in the public's trust that the organization will manage donated funds to fulfill the organization's mission.

Letting a board member's firm manage millions of dollars worth of the institution's endowment portfolio seems an obvious violation of the duty of loyalty. (Letting a board member's legal firm handle the institution's legal issues, or having a board member's advertising firm do its marketing, as described in our earlier post, also seem to be obvious violations of this duty.) A board member who sees nothing wrong with doing business with the organization he or she is supposed to steward would likely see nothing wrong in allowing the organization's mission to become a casualty of the means used to protect that business relationship.

I suspect we are soon to see many more examples of hired executives and board members of revered not-for-profit organizations who have been doing business on the side with the organizations of which they are supposed to be leaders or stewards.  These sorts of conflicts of interest may be another "missing link" explaining why the leadership and governance of health care organizations has gone so far astray. 

As disclosure continues, maybe enough outrage will ensue so that improved leadership and governance will become possible. 

Failed Leaders of Citigroup as Leaders of Health Care

When we began this blog, I never dreamed I would do so much writing about finance and the financial services sector of the economy, but,... 

The Governance of Citigroup

The discussions and revelations generated by the global financial collapse/ great recession continue to provide insights into the ongoing health care crisis.  Let me start with a small item from the Dow Jones Newswire this week:

The California Public Employees' Retirement System said it opposes the re-election of two Citigroup Inc. (C) directors, in part because of their roles in the recent financial crisis.

The nation's largest public pension fund, which owns about 61.2 million Citigroup shares, plans to cast 'withhold' votes for board nominees Andrew Liveris, chairman and chief executive of Dow Chemical Co. (DOW), and Judith Rodin, Rockefeller Foundation president, at the annual shareowners meeting Tuesday.

Both served on the company's audit and risk committee before the financial crisis. During the crisis, the banking giant accepted a total federal government infusion of $45 billion, which it has repaid.

'It's time for new blood in the boardroom,' said Anne Simpson, the senior portfolio manager who heads the Calpers corporate governance program....

Let me back up a bit.

The near-failure of global banking giant Citigroup, prevented only by a massive US government bail-out, was one of the central components of the global financial collapse. We noted recently how Mr Robert Rubin, one of the key leaders of Citigroup was accused of "being asleep at the switch," "irresponsibility and misjudgment," and being a "very well paid boob" after his testimony at hearings by the committee investigating the collapse. We also noted his link to health care. As senior member of the Harvard Corporation, Rubin is one of six top stewards of the US' oldest and arguably most presigious university, containing one the country's most prestigious medical schools and teaching hospitals.

Although all those who were members of the Citigroup at the time it collapsed have not been hauled in front of the committee, there has been considerable discussion of their responsibility for the company's failures. For example, in 2008, soon after the government rescue of Citigroup began, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial:

"Citi never sleeps," says the bank's advertising slogan. But its directors apparently do. While CEO Vikram Pandit can argue that many of Citi's problems were created before he arrived in 2007, most board members have no such excuse. Former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin has served on the Citi board for a decade. For much of that time he was chairman of the executive committee, collecting tens of millions to massage the Beltway crowd, though apparently not for asking tough questions about risk management.

Chairman Sir Win Bischoff has held senior positions at Citi since 2000. Six other directors have served for more than 10 years -- including former CIA Director John Deutch, Time Warner Chairman Richard Parsons, foundation executive Franklin Thomas, former AT&T CEO C. Michael Armstrong, Alcoa Chairman Alain Belda, and former Chevron Chairman Kenneth Derr.

When taxpayers are being asked to provide the equivalent of $1,000 each in guarantees on Citi's dubious investments, how can these men possibly say they deserve to remain on the board?

While other banks can claim to be victims of the current panic, Citi is at least a three-time loser. The same directors were at the helm in 2005 when the Fed suspended Citi's ability to make acquisitions because of the bank's failure to adhere to regulatory and ethical standards. Citi also needed resuscitation after the sovereign debt disaster of the 1980s, and it required an orchestrated private rescue in the 1990s.

Last year, as reported by Bloomberg,

Citigroup Inc. investors should vote against re-electing four of 14 board members, including John Deutch and Michael Armstrong, to improve management of the company’s risks, a shareholder advisory group said.

Deutch, former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency director, Armstrong, former AT& T Inc. chief executive officer, and Alain Belda, chairman of Alcoa Inc., should be opposed 'for poor risk oversight,' RiskMetrics Group Inc.’s ISS Governance Services said today. Xerox Corp. CEO Anne Mulcahy shouldn’t be re-elected because she sits on more than three boards, which may limit her effectiveness, the group said.

'The pattern of chronic oversight failure at Citi and the magnitude of the corresponding shareholder losses warrant removal from the board of directors most responsible for risk oversight,' RiskMetrics said in the statement.

Furthermore,

'Despite the fact that the board has many incumbent directors that have been successful in their respective fields and have been on the board for some time, their track record taken as a whole is dismal given that the company is currently surviving on federal assistance,' RiskMetrics said.

Rick Conrad, of the Seeking Alpha blog, thus berated the CEO of Citigroup at its 2009 shareholders meeting,

Mr. Armstrong, who has been a director since 1989 is no longer part of the Audit Committee, as of this year, continues his 'service' to our Company on the Nomination as well as the Compensation Committee. Much as this company has suffered under an illusion of prosperity, it appears to continue to suffer under an illusion of competence.

John [Deutch] has served on the Audit Committee of our Company since 1997 and hence, likely drank the Kool-Aid as to the Illusion of Prosperity.

I note that the audit and risk management committee has many members who, like Mr Deutch and MrArmstrong presided over this seemingly out of control disaster.

Andrew Liveris since 2005 on Audit

Ann Mulcahy since 2007 on Audit

Dr Judith Rodin since 2004 on both Executive and Audit Committees.

Overlaps Among Citigroup's Board and Health Care Organizations' Leadership
So there seems to be good reason to believe that the board of Citigroup at the time the firm collapsed were a collective example of inattentive goverance and poor stewardship. We have previously documented overlaps among poor governance and leadership of finance, and the governance and leadership of health care, suggesting that the poor leadership and governance of the latter may be in part a result of infection from the former. So I looked for overlaps among the Citigroup board and health care organizational leadership.

A list of the membership of the failed board comes from the 2008 Citigroup proxy statement.  The biographies provided therein, supplemented with some Google searching, produced the following overlaps:

- C Michael Armstrong - is also Chairman, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Health Systems and Hospital

- Alain J P Belda - was a Trustee and member of the Corporation of Brown University (including the Warren Alpert Medical School) (see link).  (He stepped down prior to 2009 at an unknown time.)

- Sir Winfried Bischoff, Chairman of the Board - is a director of Eli Lilly and Co.

- Kenneth T Derr - is a director of the University of California San Francisco Foundation.

- John M Deutch - no overlap found

- Roberto Hernandez Ramirez - no overlap found

- Andrew N Liveris - is a Trustee of Tufts University (including the School of Medicine and Tufts- New England Medical Center)

- Anne M Mulcahy - in 2009, was appointed to the Board of Directors of Johnson and Johnson (see link)

- Vikran S Pandit, CEO - is a Trustee of Columbia University (including the College of Physicians and Surgeons and Columbia University Medical Center)

- Richard D Parsons - is a Trustee of Howard University (including the College of Medicine and Howard University Hospital)

- Judith Rodin - is President of the Rockefeller Foundation

- Robert E Rubin - is a member of the Harvard Corporation (including Harvard Medical School and multiple Harvard teaching hospitals), and a Trustee of Mount Sinai Medical Center

- Robert L Ryan - was a director of UnitedHealth Group, is a Trustee of Cornell University (including Weill Cornell Medical College, and Weill Cornell Medical Center), and was a Senior Vice President and CFO of Medtronic

- Franklin A Thomas - no overlaps found

Summary

So in summary, of 14 board members, 2 are trustees of major medical centers (Johns Hopkins and Mount Sinai), 6 were or are trustees or equivalent of universities that include medical schools and medical centers (Brown, Tufts, Columbia, Howard, Harvard and Cornell), one is a trustee of such a university's foundation (University of California San Francisco Foundation), 2 are or would be board members of pharmaceutical corporations (Eli Lilly and Johnson and Johnson), one was a board member of a commercial managed care organization/ health insurance company (UnitedHealth), one was a former top executive of a medical device company (Medtronic), and one is the President of a large charitable foundation which historically has supported multiple medical and public health initiatives (Rockefeller Foundation).  Only 3 of 14 did not have a major leadership role of a health care organization.  

Most of these health care organizations have been involved with cases we have discussed on Health Care Renewal (see links above).

Given the seriousness of the failure of Citigroup, one has to wonder why so many of the directors who presided over it still have such influential positions in health care organizations?

As we have pointed out, as the world economy was driven to near ruin by "masters of the universe," some of the same also became leaders of academia and academic medicine in their spare time. Maybe this made sense 10 or 20 years ago, but why does it still make sense? On the other hand, now that we understand how bad the leadership of finance really was, it is a little easier to understand why the leadership of health care has become so bad. Iit seems reasonable to hypothesize that some of the problems of academia, and particularly the problems of medical academia, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission.  The failures of the leadership and governance of finance thus suggest we need to re-examine the leadership of health care.

WaMu Worry? - More Overlaps Between "Stewards" of Failed Financial Firms and the Leadership of Health Care Organizations

Investigations of the failures of major US financial corporations during the global financial meltdown continue to paint a picture of bad leadership.  The latest failed corporation to get public attention was Washington Mutual (WaMu).  As described by the Los Angeles Times,

Before Washington Mutual collapsed in the largest bank failure in U.S. history, its executives knowingly created a 'mortgage time bomb' by making subprime loans they knew were likely to go bad and then packaging them into risky securities, a congressional investigation has found.

In some cases, the bank took loans in which it had discovered fraudulent activity -- such as misstated income by borrowers -- and rolled them into mortgage securities sold to investors without disclosing the fraud, according to the report released Monday by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

The investigation strongly suggested that WaMu leaders ignored questions about their practices:

According to the Senate report, WaMu executives were aware in 2006 of problems at its Southern California subprime unit, Long Beach Mortgage Co. Excerpts of internal e-mails and reports offer a stark and unvarnished view of the warning signs that were dismissed as the bank tumbled toward failure.

The company's chief risk officers called Long Beach Mortgage, the subprime subsidiary the firm used to stage its rapid growth in home lending, 'a real problem for WaMu.' Stephen Rotella, WaMu's former chief operating officer, described the unit as 'terrible.'

The company and its Long Beach unit 'used shoddy lending practices . . . to make tens of thousands of high-risk home loans that too often contained excessive risk, fraudulent information or errors,' according to a subcommittee memo.

Making money in the short-term was more important than long-term consequences:

Internal company documents highlighted the profit pressures. 'In 2007, we must find new ways to grow our revenue. Home Loans Risk Management has an important role to play in that effort,' read a late 2006 message from the unit's chief risk officer to the risk management team.

A June 2008 review by the bank's main regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, found a 'culture focused more heavily on production volume rather than quality.'

Top employees could become members of the company's President's Club, which offered lavish, all-expense-paid trips to Hawaii or the Caribbean, the subcommittee found.

A vivid anecdote about this culture of greed was described by Politco,

In the years before it became the largest bank failure in American history, mortgage lenders at Washington Mutual liked to party hearty at the company’s annual retreats.

But a 2006 WaMu retreat produced one of the more cringe-worthy moments of the mortgage meltdown: Lenders, on the eve of their industry’s collapse, singing 'I Like Big Bucks' to the tune of Sir Mix-a-Lot’s 1992 hip-hop hit 'Baby Got Back.'

'I like big bucks and I cannot lie/You mortgage brothers can't deny,' sang the WaMu rappers.

The presentation, which included cheerleaders moving in time to the music, and choreographed moves by the singers, continued:

'That when the dough roles in like you're printin’ your own cash/
And you gotta make a splash/
You just spends/
Like it never ends/
Cuz you gotta have that big new Benz/
All of that bling you're wearin'/
Shining so bright peoples starin'/
It's crazy, I gotta ski Aspen/
That's all I'm askin''

The former CEO of WaMu, Kerry Killinger, was called to testify, but asserted that he was unaware of what was going on, according to a column in the Seattle Times:

Tuesday at the congressional grilling of the Washington Mutual brass on how they ran a respected, 119-year-old bank into the ground, another defense was tried: No one knows anything.

Former CEO Kerry Killinger said his bank's failure wasn't his fault (it was the economy and also the government.) But for a guy who ran the joint for 18 years, he seemed not all that clued in about what his company actually did.

Much of the questioning from a panel of U.S. senators was about WaMu's now well-known history of bundling up crappy, subprime loans, sprinkling them with fairy dust and selling them as investments on Wall Street.

The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations said it had evidence that WaMu rushed to unload some of these loans precisely because the bank knew they were rotten.

When asked about this, Killinger said he couldn't recall (they always say that). But he also said something that floored me: He never knew much about WaMu's business of securitizing subprime loans for sale on Wall Street.

Even though WaMu did it to the tune of $77 billion worth from 2000 to 2007.

'I was just simply not involved in any of those,' Killinger shrugged.

They were only the fuel for the fire that burned down the U.S. economy!

OK, well, moving on then. Killinger was asked about how even people inside WaMu considered the subprime securities coming out of WaMu's Long Beach Mortgage to be 'the worst paper in the market.'

Blank look. News to him.

How about how WaMu loan officers in various offices were involved in fraud, cutting and pasting false names on borrowers' bank statements or fabricating assets, just to move more subprime loan product?

Can't remember the specifics, said the guy who was in charge.

On it went, nearly two hours of I-have-no-knowledge or I-can't-recall.

Earlier a lower-ranking risk officer at the bank testified he'd come to Killinger in 2004 and made an 'impassioned argument' to take a stand against rampant fraud in the loan industry.

'Blow the whistle,' the guy said he urged Killinger. 'Say we at Washington Mutual will not participate any further.'

A senator asked Killinger about this. You're the CEO, the senator said. This is your bank. Didn't someone telling you there were serious fraud problems send chills up your spine?

Eh. He answered blandly that he of course tried to fix any problems. But chills? His demeanor was more Alfred E. Neuman: What, me worry?

It turns out that for his allagedly clueless leadership, Mr Killinger was paid enough to make him very rich, as per a quote from the investigation's report, via the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

WaMu’s CEO (Kerry Killinger) received millions of dollars in pay, even when his high risk loan strategy began losing money, even when the bank began to falter, and even when he was asked to leave his post. From 2003 to 2007, Mr. Killinger was paid between $11 million and $20 million each year in cash, stock, and stock options. That’s on top of four retirement plans, a deferred bonus plan, and a separate deferred compensation plan. In 2008, when he was asked to leave to leave the bank, Mr. Killinger was paid $25 million, including $15 million in severance pay. $25 million for overseeing shoddy lending practices that pumped billions of dollars of bad mortgages into the financial system. Another painful example of how executive pay at U.S. financial firms rewards failure.

It was all gut wrenching, but perhaps the connection with health care iss not obvious. Let me explain.

A question not addressed by the congressional hearings so far was how the people ultimately responsible for the direction and financial health of Washington Mutual, the company's board of directors, allowed a CEO self-described as clueless become rich while a culture of greed produced an enormous number of questionable loans which ultimately drove the company into bankruptcy. Based on the report and testimony so far, on its face the case is strong that the WaMu board must have been one of the most irresponsible groups of supposed corporate stewards yet uncovered.

A list of the 13 board members who presided over the company's final collapse can be found in the company's 2008 proxy report.

Several of them turn out also to have been or be leaders of health care organizations:

- Thomas C Leppert, director since 2005, "the Mayor of Dallas, Texas," is also a member of the board of directors of the Baylor University Health System. (see this link)

- Charles M Lillis, director since 2005, was also on the board of Medco Health Solutions Inc

- Regina T Montoya, director since 2006, then the Chief Executive Officer of the New America Alliance, is now senior vice president and general counsel for the Children's Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. (see this link)

- Margaret Osmer-McQuade, director since 2002, then President of Qualitas International, is a member of the Board of Overseers of Weill Cornell Medical College. (see this link)

- Orrin C Smith, director since 2005, then President and Chief Operating Officer of Starbucks Corporation, is a member of the University of Washington UW Medicine Strategic Initiatives Committee. (see this link)

So, in summary, members of the board of directors of the failed Washington Mutual, which seemingly collapsed in a fog of greed and irresponsibility, currently sit on the boards of a medical school, a teaching hospital, and a pharmacy benefits management corporation, and on a strategic initiatives committee of another medical school, while another is an executive of another teaching hospital. People whose "stewardship" allowed an apparently clueless CEO to become rich while a corporate culture with the theme, "I Like Big Bucks" drove their company into bankcrupty now also lead some of the most prestigious US health care organizations.

Here is yet another example of how the leadership culture that so badly failed the financial sector was tied to the leadership of health care. (We posted here about how the board of the bankrupt Lehman Brothers also leads multiple health care organizations, and here how the leaders of how some of our major universities that house medical schools overlap with the leadership of other questionable financial corporations.)

We have another vivid illustration in the aftermath of the global economic collapse, and in an ongoing health care crisis, how some of the problems of health care, and academic medicine in particular, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission. All health care organizations, for-profit and not-for-profit, those in the US and those in other countries, need leaders who value their health care and academic missions more than simply the money they may bring in.

A "Very Well Paid Boob" on the Harvard Corporation?

The ongoing investigation of the global financial collapse may also shed some indirect light on what has gone wrong with health care.  Consider the recent testimony by two leaders of the nearly failed, then bailed out global financial giant Citigroup, as reported by the New York Times. One of the leaders was Robert Rubin,

Robert E. Rubin, the former Treasury secretary, faced withering questions from the panel, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, for his spare expressions of remorse. Repeatedly playing down his role as chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup’s board, he was met with anger and disbelief.

'You were either pulling the levers or asleep at the switch,' Philip N. Angelides, the committee’s chairman, told him.

Mr. Rubin stopped short of accepting personal responsibility. He grudgingly conceded that a few savvy investors saw the crisis coming, asserting that nearly everyone in the financial services industry had failed to see a dozen powerful forces — from excessive debt levels to trade imbalance — come together in a perfect storm.

'We all bear responsibility for not recognizing this, and I deeply regret that,' Mr. Rubin said.

Mr. Rubin’s stance left several members of the panel angry. Mr. Rubin earned more than $100 million during a decade at Citigroup.

Mr. Angelides, a former California state treasurer and a fellow Democrat, did not buy it. 'You were not a garden-variety board member,' he said. 'I think to most people chairman of the executive committee of the board of directors implies leadership. Certainly $15 million a year guaranteed implies leadership and responsibility.'

Attempts by Mr Rubin (and to some extent, former Citigroup CEO Charles O Prince III) to disavow responsibility met with more derision. For example, yesterday, see a New York Times editorial:

The latest public hearings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, held last week, made headlines for eliciting more apologies from financiers who presided over the market collapse.

You may recall a similar flurry last year, when Lloyd Blankfein, the chairman and chief executive of Goldman Sachs, was widely credited for having apologized for his firm’s role in the financial crisis.

We did not buy it then; Mr. Blankfein never said what he was sorry for or to whom he was apologizing. And we are not buying it now.

Mr. Prince says he 'could not' foresee the impending collapse, when he could have and should have seen it coming. Certainly, others did. Mr. Rubin has said that under his employment agreement, he was not responsible for the bank’s operations. But he was a towering figure at Citi, a source of its credibility and prestige. That implies responsibility, no matter what his contract said. Add all that to the 'I wasn’t the only one' context of both men’s comments, and their regret translates as, 'We feel bad about an accident we were powerless to prevent.'

Except that the financial crisis was not an accident and they were not powerless. The crisis was the result of irresponsibility and misjudgments by many people, including Mr. Prince and Mr. Rubin. Citi, under their leadership, epitomized the financial recklessness that ruined the economy.

A Seattle Times columnist was even more harsh, calling Rubin a "very well paid boob," and:

Rubin was barely contrite and went back to his meme of 'who knew?,' adding the unintended comedic line about how leaders shouldn't be responsibility for the 'granularity' of little things -- such as $40 billion in essentially fraudulent collateralized debt obligations. Rubin was being paid more than $100 million as a senior adviser to Citi while it headed toward collapse and a $45 billion taxpayer rescue. So 'granularity' is in the eye of the beholder.

Commission vice chairman Bill Thomas said, 'Apparently you get to the top without having had to experience anything the people underneath you do. You don't have a comprehension. You're not informed, but you get to make all this money on the upside, but there's no downside.'

Indeed. Rubin and Citigroup epitomize the public policies and the corporate practices that brought the economy to the brink of a new depression.

As Bill Clinton's Treasury Secretary, Rubin championed financial deregulation and the financialization of the economy as manufacturing was hollowed out. Among other things he helped keep derivatives from being regulated and encouraged the creation of 'too big to fail' institutions such as Citi. Rubin led the battle to dismantle Glass-Steagall, so Citi and its giant siblings could gamble in investment banking, while also doing commercial banking and insurance. An alum of Goldman Sachs, Rubin was fine with big compensation for executives, even if their leadership wrecked the bank (Prince walked away with $120 million). Funny how Rubin was offered the lucrative Citi position after he left such 'government service.'

So what does this tell us about health care? As we noted before, while Robert Rubin is no longer on the board of Citigroup, he has been a member of the Harvard Corporation since 2001. The Corporation is ultimately responsible for the US' oldest and most prestigious university, its equally prestigious medical school and teaching hospitals. Yet under Rubin's stewardship, Harvard's endowment has fallen a prodigious amount, and Harvard and its Partners Healthcare hospital system have faced charges of conflicts of interest and various sweetheart deals. Perhaps this is to be expected when the ultimate steward may be a "very well paid boob."

While Rubin's impressive resume and wealth in 2001 may have provided a rationale for his appointment to the Corporation, what would be the rationale for his continuing service?

As we have pointed out, as the world economy was driven to near ruin by "masters of the universe," some of the same also became leaders of academia and academic medicine in their spare time. Maybe this made sense 10 or 20 years ago, but why does it still make sense? On the other hand, now that we understand how bad the leadership of finance really was, it is a little easier to understand why the leadership of health care has become so bad.

Members of the Board of Now Bankrupt Lehman Brothers as Leaders of Health Care?

In our own Providence Journal, Michael Hiltzik commented about the Valukas report on the fall of the once proud Lehman Brothers.  He asserted that one of the lessons learned from the case is the "folly of relying on self-discipline and self-regulation in the financial markets," particularly given the irresponsibility of the top leaders of financial corporations. In particular,

I’d love to hear an argument for allowing any of Lehman’s independent directors, who seem seldom to have asked a penetrating question, ever to serve on a corporate board again.

As I write, those 10 directors, who pulled down better than $100,000 cash a year to sit jointly in the driver’s seat for Lehman’s race to disaster, still boast at least 15 company directorships among them. Does this make you confident that corporate America is in good hands? Me neither.

It also should not make us confident that health care, and academic medicine, in the US and elsewhere, are in good hands. Hiltzik declined to name the members of the Lehman board, or identify the other organizations that they lead.  One can find a list of the directors who presided over the demise of Lehman in the company's 2008 proxy statement. It turns out that while they were presiding over Lehman's collapse, they also were presiding over the direction of some major health care organizations, to wit:

MICHAEL L. AINSLIE Director since 1996

Trustee of Vanderbilt University [including the School of Medicine]

JOHN F. AKERS Director since 1996

ROGER S. BERLIND Director since 1985

MARSHA JOHNSON EVANS Director since 2004

Ms. Evans served as President and Chief Executive Officer of the American Red Cross from August 2002 to December 2005.

RICHARD S. FULD, JR. Director since 1990

serves on the Board of Trustees of ... New York-Presbyterian Hospital

SIR CHRISTOPHER GENT Director since 2003

Non-Executive Chairman of GlaxoSmithKline plc.

JERRY A. GRUNDHOFER

Mr. Grundhofer is a director of Ecolab, Inc ["As a leader in infection prevention, Ecolab provides products, tools, training and service to healthcare facilities to help prevent the spread of healthcare acquired infections.]

ROLAND A. HERNANDEZ Director since 2005

HENRY KAUFMAN Director since 1995

a Member of the Board of Trustees of New York University [including the School of Medicine]

a Member of the Board of Governors of Tel-Aviv University [including the Sackler Faculty of Medicine]

JOHN D. MACOMBER Director since 1994

[Also, a member of the board of directors of Warren Pharmaceuticals, "a privately held biotech company, incorporated in 2001 for the purpose of developing proprietary tissue-protective technologies."

So, collectively, the confidence uninspiring members of the board of the now defunct Lehman Brothers also were on the boards of two major US and one major Israeli university that include well-known medical schools, one major health care related charity, one major British multi-national pharmaceutical company, a prestigious academic medical center, a large public for-profit US company with major health care interests, and a small, privately held biotechnology company. 

We have another vivid illustration in the aftermath of the global economic collapse, and in an ongoing health care crisis, how some of the problems of health care, and academic medicine in particular, may have been at least enabled by leadership more used to working in an increasingly amoral marketplace than to upholding the academic mission. All health care organizations, for-profit and not-for-profit, those in the US and those in other countries, need leaders who value their health care and academic missions more than simply the money they may bring in.